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MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF URBAN EXPANSION
HENRY J. SCHMANDT*
W E 1960 census returns, once again dramatizing the "explosive"
population increases that are occurring in metropolitan areas, re-
vealed that over eighty per cent of the Nation's total population jump
of twenty-eight million during the last decennial period took place in these
agglomerations. More significantly, they showed that the overwhelming
percentage of this growth continued to occur outside the central cities.
Suburban sectors accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total na-
tional increase while a substantial number of core cities showed actual
population losses. Moreover, at current growth rates, the United States
will have approximately fifty million additional inhabitants by 1975, at
least seventy per cent of whom are expected to live in the suburbs.
As the census enumeration indicates, the tidal wave of metropolitan
growth is engulfing the suburbs and bringing them face to face with the
realities of urban expansion. Visions of semi-rustic life have vanished in
the ring communities as the urbanized sectors have pushed outward,
bringing in their wake new roads and expressways, huge shopping centers
and industrial plants, and blight and congestion. The situation is familiar
even to the most casual observer of the urban scene. Increasing service
demands, mounting governmental costs, rising tax rates, and land use
sprawl have become the common lot of outlying local units situated in
the path of this growth.
Although the phenomenon of expansion is one of concern to the entire
metropolitan community,1 the task of guiding and controlling it is divided
among the numerous political subdivisions that blanket the countryside
around the central cities. Whether desirable or not, political realities
make major changes in existing local governmental patterns unlikely in
the foreseeable future. For example, efforts made to place certain key
functions such as planning and land use control in metropolitan agencies
with area-wide authority habitually have met cold public receptions in
this country. The likelihood is that suburban governmental entities will
continue indefinitely to struggle with the pressures of expansion indi-
vidually rather than collectively. Under these circumstances it is reason-
able to anticipate that most of the major zoning and subdivision control
cases during the current decade, just as in the last, will arise in outlying
municipalities and townships.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin (Mihlwaukce).
1. The term "community" is used here in the sense of a functionally interdepcndent
entity-an area in which the resident population is interrelated with reference to it- daily
requirements. Hence it includes both central city and suburbs.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Suburban communities have viewed with mounting alarm the patent
consequences of poorly ordered growth. Convinced of the need for exer-
cising greater direction over the expansion within their boundaries, they
have sought to exploit their zoning and subdivision powers more fully and
effectively. In the process, the traditional uses of these controls have
been greatly modified. With the aid of zoning, many suburbs endeavor to
regulate not only the character of their growth but its timing and se-
quence as well.2
Zoning has been employed to assist in the development of a balanced
tax base not alone by establishing industrial districts but, equally im-
portant, by protecting them against encroachment from other uses. And
through subdivision regulation, the communities seek to place on the
developers a share of the burden of providing the additional school and
other public facilities necessitated by new residential projects.
The purpose of the present article is twofold: to review two of the
major legal tools-zoning and subdivision regulation-that are available
to local governments for controlling growth, and to discuss the new uses
of these instrumentalities in the light of existing and emerging conditions
in the Nation's urban areas.
ZONING CONTROLS
In planning for expansion, cities, villages and towns must make cer-
tain basic policy decisions, two of which pertain to land use: how in-
tensively should their vacant land be developed, and what should be the
character of this development? These determinations can be made in-
telligently only in the light of many variables, such as the location and
general characteristics of the area, existing land uses, community resources
and objectives, potential service demands, housing needs, and availability
of utilities. Intensity of land development is regulated largely through
population density controls imposed under the zoning powers of local
governments. The devices commonly employed for this purpose are
establishment of minimum lot specifications and placing of limitations on
the bulk or size of residential buildings.
Minimum Lot Size
Since Simon v. Town of Needham,3 courts have generally regarded
minimum lot standards as a valid exercise of the police power. The legal
question at issue in each case is whether the particular zoning require-
ment bears some reasonable relationship to the health, safety, and general
2. See Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob.
298 (1955).
3. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
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welfare of the community. In making this determination, courts have
usually been guided by criteria of such general nature that empirical
substantiation of the test of "reasonableness" would be difficult to make.
In Needham, for example, where a zoning requirement of one acre per
residence was in question, the opinion merely stated that "advantages
enjoyed by those living in one family dwellings located upon an acre lot
might be thought to exceed those possessed by persons living upon a lot
of ten thousand square feet."' Admitting that there might be differences
of opinion as to whether one-acre zoning would result in a "real and
genuine enhancement of the public interests," the court declined to sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the people who voted in favor of such an
ordinance.'
The same pattern is followed in most of the minimum lot size cases.
While the courts frequently speak of such objectives as lessening con-
gestion on the streets, securing safety from fire, providing adequate
light and air, and preventing overcrowding, they seldom refer to the
criteria or standards for making these determinations. Even in Flora
Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue,0 where the court entered into an
extensive discussion of the municipality's comprehensive plan of develop-
ment and noted that it would be "unbalanced by increased density," lit-
tle was said of the standards employed to reach this conclusion. In fact,
a careful reading of the case leaves the impression that the most per-
suasive factor influencing the decision was the intrusion of smaller lots
into an area of large estates and the likely effect on property values.
Minimum lot zoning as high as five acres has been upheld in somejurisdictions,7 although the larger the restriction, the more difficult its
justification. It seems safe to say, given present judicial attitudes, that a
requirement of one half acre would be universally sustained, a minimum
of one acre seldom invalidated, and restrictions above one acre scrutinized
more carefully before acceptance. In the few instances where minimum
lot sizes have been invalidated, the decisions have rested primarily on
the rationale that the prescribed requirements were excessive in view of
4. Id. at 563, 42 N.E.2d at 51S. (Emphasis added.)
5. Ibid.
6. 362 M11o. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771, appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. C02 (1952) (three-acre zon-
ing requirement upheld).
7. See, e.g., Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 373 (1952). See
also Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959) (four-acre requirement
sustained); Bogert v. Township of Washington, 25 N.J. 57, 135 A.2d 1 (1957) (one-acre
standard approved); Harrison Ridge Associates Corp. v. Sforza, 6 App. Div. 2d 1051, 179
N.YS.2d 547 (2d Dep't 195S) (one-acre standard approved); Dillard v. Village of North
Hills, 195 Mlisc. S75, 91 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1949), rev'd mew., 276 App. Div. 476g, 94
N.Y.S.2d 715 (2d Dep't 1950) (two-acre minimum upheld); Mellis Realties, Inc. v. Town
Ed., 14 Misc. 2d S54, 179 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (one-half acre restriction upheld).
1961]
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properties already developed in adjacent areas on considerably less space
per lot.8
Courts have issued caveats in several minimum lot cases that the zon-
ing power cannot be used to bar certain economic classes from the com-
munity. In Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, the court declared by way
of dictum that "a zoning ordinance may not be used for ... setting up
barriers against the influx of persons who are able and willing to erect
homes upon lots which are reasonably restricted."' 0 Yet in no recent case
has such a minimum been invalidated because of its exclusionary char-
acter. The issue was raised in the Flora Realty case, but the court simply
remarked that it did not "view the ordinance as an attempt to segregate
economic classes by zoning or as an attempt to restrict the ... districts
to particular classes of residents."" How it could justify this conclusion
is not clear from the opinion. The community was situated directly in
the path of urban expansion and was virtually surrounded by other
municipalities with far lower zoning requirements than the three-acre
minimum which was in force throughout most of the defendant city. The
facts would seem to raise a strong inference of exclusion which the deci-
sion completely ignored. Thus despite dicta about economic segregation,
it appears evident from Flora Realty and similar cases that courts are
not prepared to strike down zoning on this ground alone.' 2
Size of Dwelling
Another means of controlling density relates to size or bulk of dwelling
units. These restrictions take several forms: height controls expressed in
simple footage statements of maximum height; floor area ratios pre-
scribed as a function of the lot area; or minimum floor space or cubic
content for buildings. 13 The first two forms are used primarily in dis-
tricts where multifamily or apartment dwellings are permitted, the third,
in single family districts. Bulk regulations are employed to achieve two
ends in addition to control over density of population: adequate day-
8. County of Du Page v. Halkier, 1 Ill. 2d 491, 115 N.E.2d 635 (1953); Hitcbman v.
Township of Oakland, 329 Mich. 331, 45 N.W.2d 306 (1951).
9. 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
10. Id. at 489, 99 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
11. 362 Mo. 1025, 1041, 246 S.W.2d 771, 779 (1952).
12. See generally Williams, Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 317, 343-48 (1955).
13. Lower density of course can be assured by completely banning multifamily develop-
ments from all or a large portion of the community, as many suburban municipalities have
done. For a case approving total exclusion, see Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11
N.J. Super. 405, 78 A.2d 435 (Super. Ct. 1951).
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lighting of buildings, and sufficient open space around dwellings for rest
and recreation.' 4
Reasonable regulations over building heights were early upheld as a
valid exercise of the police power." The original motivation was the day-
lighting of buildings rather than the regulation of density. These controls
were later welded into the machinery of zoning, with their original
justification shifting to a limitation on density. The more recent bulk
regulations, while varying in form, turn on the relationship between floor
area and lot size. An Olivette, Missouri, ordinance is typical of restric-
tions in this group. It prescribes that every building used for multiple
dwelling purposes shall provide a lot area of not less than 2000 square
feet per family.' 6 Other ordinances employ a floor area ratio expressed
as a multiple by which the floor space of a building may exceed the lot
size. Thus a floor-lot area ratio of two permiits a total floor area of not
more than twice the size of the lot. 7 Proper use of this device not only
regulates density but also insures the preservation of open space even
where high-rise apartments are permitted.
The control of density through minimum house size requirements has
been the subject of more vigorous controversy. Objectors on social or
ethical grounds view the principal purpose of such restrictions as eco-
nomic segregation; they point out that these limitations achieve the same
effect as minimum cost requirements on homes, which courts have never
approved. Until the now celebrated Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of
Wayne,' s the constitutionality of minimum floor area ordinances had been
in question? The Lionshead Lake case explicitly declared that such
standards are justified since "the size of the dwellings in any community
14. As to the nature and purposes of bulk controls generally, see San-Lan Buildcrc, Inc. v.
Baxendale, 28 N.J. 143, 145 A.2d 457 (195S).
15. Brougher v. Board of Pub. Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 Pac. 437 (1927); Welch v.
Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), aff'd, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Wulfshn v. Burden,
241 N.Y. 233, 150 N.E. 120 (1925).
16. Olivette, 'Mo., Rev. Code § 280.076 (1957). See also Cary v. Cscidy, 31 R1. 411, 103
A.2d 793 (1954), upholding a similar provision.
17. The question of the validity of this device has appearcd in only one ca-e, in which
approval was indicated by dictum. Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 623, 635, 643, 149 N.E. 30,
32, 35 (1925).
13. 10 NJ. 165, S) A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). Se,
DeMars v. Zoning Commn, 19 Conn. Supp. 24, 109 A.2d 376 (C.P. 1954), aft'd, 142 Conn.
598, 115 A.2d 655 (1955).
19. See Senefsky v. City of Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 723, 12 X.W 2d K 7 (1943);
Baker v. Somerville, 133 Neb. 466, 293 N.W. 326 (1940); Broohd-de HomQ-, Inc. v. John-
son, 126 N.J.L. 516, 19 A.2d 363 (CL Err. & App. 1941). One of the first car 5 to uphold a
minimum floor area provision was Thompson v. City of Carrollton, 211 S.W2d 970 (Te".
Ct. Civ. App. 1943). See also Flower Hill Bldg. Corp. v. Village of Flower Hill, 1M9 di-c.
344, 100 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
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inevitably affects the character of the community and does much to de-
termine whether or not it is a desirable place in which to live."20 The
Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal left little doubt as to the validity
of such restrictions.
21
It is interesting to note in passing that the Lionshead Lake decision
purported to take into consideration the average income of residents of
the area in relation to cost of houses of the required size. The dissenting
opinion also touched upon this point, noting that the ordinance pre-
cluded individuals who could not pay the estimated cost range for homes
of the specified minimum from establishing residence in the community.
This case marked one of the first instances where courts have examined,
albeit in a cursory and superficial fashion, a zoning requirement in terms
of the needs and economic resources of prospective purchasers.
Industrial Zoning
Although not directly related to density, industrial zoning is a major
factor that cannot be overlooked in any discussion of urban expansion.
Suburban municipalities situated in the path of growth are subject to
strong demands for residential development. The more immediate demand
for homes than for industrial sites induces builders to utilize the land for
this purpose. Confronted with this pressure, local legislative bodies fre-
quently permit the elimination of prime industrial sites by residential
subdivision. In recent years, however, suburban municipalities have come
to look with increasing favor on industrial development as a palliative to
their fiscal ills. Not only have many of them set aside land for future
industrial use but they have also erected protective barriers around these
areas by mutually exclusive zoning. Some of them, moreover, have sought
to facilitate industrial location by adopting performance zoning rather
than the conventional type regulations.
Traditionally, one of the major objectives of zoning has been the isola-
tion of industrial uses from residential districts in order to protect prop-
erty values in the latter and to guard against the intrusion of noise, smoke,
and congestion in home areas. The reverse-protection of industry from
residential development-has long been ignored. This neglect is at least
20. 10 N.J. at 174, 89 A.2d at 697.
21. The Lionshead Lake case has generated much discussion. See, e.g., Haar, Zoning for
Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1051 (1953); Nolan &
Horack, How Small a House?-Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements, 67 Harv. L. Rev.
967 (1954); Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 986 (1954). Among other objections to the decision, critics have charged that a mini-
mum floor space requirement without reference to the number of occupants is meaningless.
The opinion did take notice of the logic in relating minimum living space to actual occu-
pancy, observing that perhaps some later ordinance would attempt to deal with this complex
subject. 10 N.J. at 180, 89 A.2d at 700-01.
[Vol. 29
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partially attributable to conventional zoning, sometimes referred to as
pyramidal or cumulative, which permits a carry forward of all previously
defined uses to each successively lower classification. Thus, residential
use, as the most restricted, may be allowed in the lower categories of
commerce and industry. The fallacy of this practice has become increas-
ingly apparent in recent years as suburban areas have experienced the
need for industrial development. There is now strong feeling that in-
dustrial districts also require protection against encroachment by uses
that reduce the space suitable for plant expansion. This conviction has
prompted some municipalities to break away from the common zoning
pattern by prohibiting other uses within industrial zones.
Exclusive industrial zoning was regarded with little sympathy or under-
standing in the initial cases involving its use. In Corthozts v. Town of
Newington, .2 the first test of the validity of such an ordinance, the court
refused to exclude residences from an industrial district. Two years later
the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted the construction of a retail
shopping center in a district zoned exclusively for light industry despite
the plea of the city that such use would be detrimental to the orderly
development of the area for limited industrial purposes.2 The same year
a Michigan decisionF-s held a similar ordinance unreasonable as to an
owner who wanted to build a motel in an industrially-zoned district. The
court noted that "the construction of a motel of the type planned by
plaintiff would have . .. [no] tendency to affect injuriously the health,
safety, or welfare of occupants of such motel, residents in the vicinity, or
the public generally.12 5 No mention was made of the possible deleterious
effects on industrial development.
It was not until 1956 that the first decision clearly upholding exclu-
sive industrial zoning was handed down." However, the opinion was based
on the protection not of industry but of residential property. The court
found it undesirable from the standpoint of health and blight to permit
residential development in an area surrounded by heavy industry. It
stated, nevertheless-and this was a major advance-that it found noth-
ing arbitrary or unreasonable per se in a zoning plan which prevented so-
called higher uses from invading a lower use area. -7 The final step was
22. 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953).
23. Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 NJ. 114, 118 A2d 824 (1955).
24. Comer v. City of Dearborn, 342 MIch. 471, 70 N.W.2d 813 (1955).
25. Id. at 479, 70 N.W.2d at 817.
26. Roney v. Board of Supervisors, 133 Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P2d 529 (Dkt. Ct, App.
1956). See also Newark Milk & Cream Co. v. Tovwnship of Parsippany-Troy Hil, 47 NZJ.
Super. 306, 135 A.2d 682 (Super. Ct. 1957), upholding cxcluson of all other uzo from an
area zoned as "specialized economic development district." For a ks syrnpathctic treatment
of this question, see City of Toledo v. Miller, 105 Ohio App. 290, 14 N.E.2d 169 (1957).
27. 133 Cal. App. 2d at 746, 292 P.2d at 532. See also Ioeesnil: v. Townzhip of Mont-
19611
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taken in 1959 when the Illinois Supreme Court based its approval of an
exclusive zoning ordinance squarely on the protection of industrial ex-
pansion.28 Observing that an ordinance of this type is "a radical de-
parture from our thinking and opinion in the past," the court declared
that "in final analysis, it seems clear that industry and commerce are also
necessary ... and that a proper environment for them will promote the
general welfare of the public."'29 The court acknowledged the necessity
of providing industry and commerce with a favorable climate and noted
that the sale of a few lots for residential purposes at important points
in a nonresidential district might make industrial or commercial expan-
sion impossible or unduly expensive. The two controlling factors, as listed
by this court, in determining the reasonableness of an exclusive zoning
ordinance of this nature are the suitability of the land for industrial or
commercial purposes and the likely need and demand for such use in the
near future.3 °
In addition to protecting industrial districts from encroachment by
other uses, a number of municipalities have endeavored to provide a more
flexible system than the conventional light-heavy industry classification
for regulating nonresidential use. The device employed for this purpose
has been performance zoning, which seeks to avoid branding some in-
dustries as undesirable per se and either prohibiting them entirely or
relegating them to a "heavy industry" district. In jurisdictions where
performance zoning has been adopted, standards relating to such matters
as smoke, noise, waste, and traffic are established in the ordinance to
measure the external effects of industry upon adjacent uses. Any industry
able to meet these standards is permitted to operate in an industrial dis-
trict. In other words, more weight is given to the actual and potential
effects of the plant on the surrounding area than to the type of industry.
Performance standards ordinances are tailored to reward those estab-
lishments which design their plants and install modern controls in such a
way as to minimize the normal effects of industrial operations on nearby
uses. These ordinances also place the community in a better position to
accommodate industries which might otherwise be barred under conven-
tional zoning codes. Performance standards for industrial location have
been adopted in Columbus, Ohio, Bismarck, North Dakota, Palm Springs,
California, and Warren Township, Michigan, to cite but a few instances.
To date, there is little in the way of judicial pronouncement on the sub-
gomery, 24 N.J. 154, 169, 131 A.2d 1, 9 (1957), where the court stated that there is no rule
of law which ordains that any one use has an exalted position in a zoning scheme.
28. People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove, 16 Ill.
2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959).
29. Id. at 188-89, 157 N.E.2d at 36.
30. Id. at 188-90, 157 N.E.2d at 36.
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ject. As long as reasonable and sufficiently definite standards can be
devised-a task presenting some difficulties-performance zoning pre-
sumably meets the test of legality.
SUBDIVISION CONTROL
Subdivision regulation, like zoning, is of relatively recent vintage. Both
are major tools for carrying out land use planning; both serve similar
functions in that they attempt to achieve controlled development of a
community by limiting what an owner may do with his land. Subdivision
controls were prompted by the many problems and abuses which flowed
from unregulated division of land holdings for development purposes.
Disconnected street patterns, failure to provide essential utilities, and
poor planning in general were among the difficulties that arose in the
wake of extensive land division.
The earliest statutes and ordinances dealing with subdivisions were
designed to insure that plats dividing land into lots were accurate and
usable for recording and tax assessment purposes. Later, qualitative
controls were employed requiring the subdivider to grade and pave streets
according to certain standards, provide water and sewer utilities, and
plan the development in a manner conducive to the well-being of the
prospective occupants and the community in general.3? It is today con-
ceded that a municipality has the power to impose these controls on the
developer and to require him to build at his own cost on-site public im-
provements such as roads, sewers, and water mains. -2 Whether he can be
compelled to provide or pay for improvements that are not directly re-
lated to the subdivision is now the subject of much litigation.
In recent years, expanding suburban communities have found them-
selves confronted with large service needs. The development of numerous
new subdivisions has placed severe strains upon capital plants and other
local government facilities. Cities and towns in the path of the popu-
lation surge have found it necessary to provide new school buildings,
additional police and fire stations, larger sewage treatment systems, more
recreational facilities, and enlarged office space to house the added ad-
ministrative personnel. In fact, each new house in a suburban sub-
31. As to subdivision control and administration generally, sca Note, 65 Harv. L. Rcy.
1226 (1952).
32. Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Petterzon v. City of
Naperville, 9 BlL 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956); In the Matter of the Lake SEccor Dcv. Coo,
141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. S09 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Zastrow v. Village of Brown Der,
9 Wrs. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960). See also Wine v. Council of City of Los .AngeIe:'
177 Cal. App. 2d 157, 171, 2 Cal. Rep. 94, 103 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960), where the court held
that a developer could not be required to pay the cost of improving off-site strccts in the
adjacent area.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
division requires public services that entail capital outlays of $2,500 to
$3,500 or more, only a portion of which is recouped through normal
subdivision regulations requiring the builder to install streets, sewers,
and other on-site improvements. Evidencing a growing sentiment that
new residents should somehow be charged with a greater share of the
capital burden precipitated by their presence, some municipalities have
sought to increase substantially their building permit fees; other have
turned to new uses of subdivision control as a means of accomplishing
the same result. Neither effort has met with warm judicial approbation.
An ordinance increasing building inspection fees to more than 700 per
cent of the cost of inspecting the buildings and regulating the construction
was voided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Daniels v. Borough of
Point Pleasant.33 Noting that the admitted purpose of the ordinance was
to raise revenue for defraying the increased cost of school and other
governmental services, the court declared that "the philosophy of this
ordinance is that the tax rate . . . should remain the same and the new
people coming into the municipality should bear the burden of the in-
creased costs of their presence. This is so totally contrary to tax philoso-
phy as to require it to be stricken down. . .. ,,'4 Similarly, in a late
Michigan case,35 where fees for building permits were raised to more than
$200 for an average residence, the court disallowed the use of the police
power as a subterfuge to enact and enforce what was in reality a revenue
measure. "[W]hat was sought to be defrayed [here]," the opinion ob-
served, "was 'the general cost of government under the guise of reim-
bursement for the special services required by the regulation and control
of new buildings.' "36
Subdivision regulations designed for the same purpose have generally
met a like judicial fate: consider, for instance, Kelber v. City of Upland,7
and Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove.38 Kelber invalidated an ordi-
nance requiring a subdivider, as a condition precedent to approval of a
plat, to pay thirty dollars per lot into a park and school site fund and a
large sum into a drainage fund. The city argued that the provision, de-
signed to help meet its growing needs, was in line with the modern
tendency to extend the police power to include a broader field of public
welfare. Although the case was determined on grounds of lack of statu-
tory authority, language in the opinion casts doubt on the validity of
such a requirement even with express legislative authorization. For ex-
33. 23 N.J. 357, 129 A.2d 265 (1957).
34. Id. at 362, 129 A.2d at 267.
35. Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 355 Mich. 575, 96 N.W.2d 144 (1959).
36. Id. at 588, 96 N.W.2d at 150, quoting the Daniels case, supra note 33.
37. 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957).
38. 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
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ample, the court pointed out that the prerequisites established in the ordi-
nance were actually fund-raising methods designed to help meet future
needs not of the subdivision itself but of the entire city. 3 If only the
needs of the subdivision are relevant to the test of reasonableness, as
Kelber and subsequent decisions seemed to indicate,"0 local governments
should view some of the new-platting preconditions with caution.
The Rosen court voided an ordinance requiring payment of $325 per
lot in new subdivisions to provide for schools. As in Kelber, the decision
was grounded on lack of statutory authority. Illinois law specified that no
subdivision plat "shall be entitled to record or shall be valid unless the
subdivision shown thereon provides for streets, alleys, and public grounds
in conformity with the applicable requirements of the official plan."'
The court held that this language, while perhaps sufficient to cover the
dedication of school land (under the category of "public grounds"), did
not authorize a municipality to provide for schools by requiring sub-
dividers to pay a specified amount for each lot in the development. Thus,
"regardless of advantages of flexibility in equalizing financial burdens
that might be secured by substituting monetary charges for the dedica-
tion of land.., the plain fact is that the statute does not authorize this
technique." 42
Whether the court would have viewed the requirement more favorably
had the necessary legal authorization existed was not stated. Yet here
again, as in Kelber, the opinion contained language indicating general dis-
favor with devices of this kind. First of all it noted that because plat
approval affords an appropriate point of control as to costs made neces-
sary by the subdivision, it does not follow that communities may use this
point of control to solve every foreseeable problem.,' Second, it observed
that valid subdivision requirements are based on the theory that develop-
ers should assume those costs which are specifically and uniquely at-
tributable to their activity and which otherwise would be cast upon the
general publicl It was on this theory, the court stated, that it had pre-
39. 155 Cal. App. 2d at 63S, 31S P.2d at 565-66.
40. See, e.g., Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d S6, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rep. 493
(1960).
41. 2 Ill. Laws 1941, at 19. This section was amended in 1959 to include requirement- for
"ways for public service facilities, storm or floodwater runoff channels and basins-" Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 24, § 53-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960).
42. 19 Ill. 2d at 454, 167 N.E.2d at 234. See also Ridgemont Dev. Co. v. City of East
Detroit, 358 Mich. 337, lCD N.W.2d 301 (1960), where the court set aside for lack of Etatu-
tory authority a requirement that one lot in each subdivision be conveyed to the city for
playgrounds.
43. 19 IMI. 2d at 453, 167 N.E.2d at 234 (1960).
44. Id. at 453, 167 N.E.2d at 233-34.
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viously upheld a requirement calling for the installation of curbs and
gutters by the subdivider.4"
As the Kelber and Rosen cases indicate, two questions loom large in
current litigation over subdivision regulation: (1) whether a municipality
may compel the dedication of land within a new development for public
purposes other than streets and utilities; and (2) whether it may compel
the payment of sums of money in lieu of dedication for such purposes.
Underlying these two questions is the more basic issue as to whether a
subdivider can be required to provide land or funds for municipal pro-
jects and improvements not directly related to and for the exclusive bene-
fit of the land to be developed and its subsequent owners.
Several hypothetical instances, entitled A, B, C, D, and E, might be
cited to illustrate the point at issue here. In case (A) a municipality
constructs, equips, and pays for a new fire station. Later, new subdivi-
sions are developed which are to be served by this station. To compel
new residents to pay a share of the cost of the already built and paid-for
facility, the community demands a special fee of the subdividers as a
condition to plat approval. In case (B) a subdivider is required to pay
a hook-in charge for each lot connecting into the city sewerage system.
In case (C) the developer is compelled to dedicate land for park and
recreation purposes in an amount that would be reasonably needed by
potential residents of the new subdivision. In case (D) the subdivider
is required to dedicate land for a future school building; and in case (E)
he is compelled to either dedicate park and school land or pay a fee in
lieu thereof.
Case (A) presents little difficulty from a legal standpoint. The courts
have uniformly insisted that subdivision controls cannot be used to raise
funds for general municipal purposes. A situation is conceivable, how-
ever, where the fire protection needs of a large new development would
require an additional station to serve the subdivision only. In such a
situation, could the developer be required to contribute to the cost of the
capital facility? This perhaps farfetched instance indicates the kinds of
difficulties that can arise when subdivision controls are extended into the
field of municipal financing.
Case (B) involves a question of concern to many municipalities.
Sewage treatment plants and trunk or outlet sewer lines are constructed
on the basis of anticipated future needs. The original capital investment
is therefore usually much larger than would otherwise be required to
meet present demands. Many municipalities charge a connection fee to
new users in order to offset the additional original burden assumed by the
community for their benefit. The issue was raised in a recent California
45. See Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
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case in which the validity of a fee for connection to the city sewer-
age system was upheld over the objection of the subdivider 0 The
fees were placed in a special trust fund of the municipality to be used ex-
clusively for the construction of outlet sewers. In sustaining the require-
ment, the court rejected the argument that others had already paid for
the system. It held simply that "new subdivisions should be required to
pay their fair share in the use of this vitally essential service. 47 Although
the validity of sewer connection fees as a prerequisite to subdivision plat
approval has not been universally accepted, the California opinion ap-
pears to indicate the general trend.
The dedication or setting aside of land for park and recreational pur-
poses, as illustrated by case (C), is acceptable to many courts as a means
of preserving open spaces. The Rosen decision found no occasion to
quarrel with the Illinois statutory requirement that the developer pro-
vide "public grounds." Similarly, in Reggs Homes, Inc. v. Dickcrson, s
a late New York case, the court held that a planning board may legiti-
mately demand the inclusion of park facilities in approving a plat.
The dedication of land for school purposes, as postulated in case (D),
was separated from the question of park lands because of a possible legal
distinction in the two types of uses. It is much easier to show that park
and recreational land is an on-site improvement for the direct and almost
exclusive benefit of the subdivision residents than it is to demonstrate the
same result in the case of land for school grounds. The latter is more
likely to be for the use of the general area than solely for subdivision oc-
cupants and is therefore vulnerable to the objection that it is a revenue-
raising device.
Case (E) is another version of (C) and (D 1. The requirement of
money payments in lieu of land dedication is becoming more popular
since the latter frequently results in the acquisition of land by a munici-
pality in places where it is not needed or in parcels that are too small for
46. Longridge Estates v. City of Los Angeles, 133 Adv. Cal. App. 531, 6 Cal. Rcp. NO)
(Dist. CL App. 1960).
47. Ibid.
48. 16 Alisc. 2d 732, 179 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 195s), aff'd mcm., S App. Div. 2d 649,
186 N.Y.S.2d 215 (2d Dep't 1959). New York law provides that planning hoard- a- a condi-
tion of approval may require that "a park or parks suitably located for playground or other
recreational purposes" be included in the plat, such parks to be of "reazzonable cize for
neighborhood playgrounds or other recreation uses. . . ." N.Y. Gen. City Law § 33.
Connecticut laws also call for the inclusion of open spacez for parks and playgrounds in
places deemed proper by the planning commission. Conn. Gcn. Stat. § s-25 (19?0). The
Oregon Legislature has given broad powers to local governing bodies to adopt ctandards in
addition to those provided by law. These standards may include requirements "for facilitat-
ing adequate proxision of transportation, water supply, scwerage, drainage, education, rccrea-
tion, or other needs." Ore. Rev. Stat. § 92.044 (1957).
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any practical use. If requirements for the dedication of land are valid, it
seems logical to conclude that money stipulations in lieu thereof are also
legal. The fee route, however, is more susceptible to the criticism that
funds so collected are for general community use rather than for the ex-
clusive benefit of the subdivision. Most opinion to date looks askance at
fee provisions. For example, the 1959 report of the Committee on Zoning
and Planning of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers warned
municipalities against the use of this device. 49 It called attention to the
probable unconstitutionality of such provisions and the possibility that
communities employing this device might find themselves required to pay
back money collected and even spent. The report also noted that the
Planning Advisory Commission to the Governor and Legislature of New
Jersey had endeavored unsuccessfully to find a constitutional way of pro-
viding legislation to validate the fee practice.
While most of the pertinent cases on fee provisions have thus far
turned on the question of statutory authority, a recent New York lower
court decision declared unconstitutional that portion of the state's Town
Law which authorized town boards to require money payments in lieu
of land as a condition of plat approval." The Town of Newburgh, acting
under this law, had required a subdivider to pay a fee of $50 per lot into
a special fund earmarked for future acquisition or improvement of
recreational facilities in the town. Although the statute was invalidated
for failure to set out sufficient standards to guide the holders of the
delegated authority, the opinion strongly intimated that developers can-
not be compelled constitutionally to pay for improvements that are for the
benefit of the community as a whole and not directly related to the sub-
division. The same point was made in a late Oregon case in which the
court struck down a county ordinance permitting the planning board to
require money in lieu of park land. 1 Here again, while the decision was
formally based on lack of statutory authority for such a requirement, the
court observed that the ordinance contained nothing to relate the money
or its expenditure to the land being subdivided.
49. Stickel, Report of Committee on Zoning and Planning, 22 NIMLO Municipal L. Rev.
422, 428 (1959).
50. Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh, 25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729
(Sup. Ct. 1960). The portion of the Town Law at issue in this case provides: "If the plan-
ning board determines that a suitable park or parks of adequate size cannot be properly
located in any such plat or is otherwise not practical, the board may require as a condition
to approval of any such plat a payment to the town of an amount to be determined by the
town board, which amount shall be available for use by the town for neighborhood park,
playground or recreation purposes including the acquisition of property." N.Y. Town Law §
277.
51. Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108 (Ore. 1961).
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THE Tmmrc OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Urban communities are far more planning conscious today than a
decade ago. As the unfortunate results of planless growth have made
themselves increasingly manifest, public official and private citizen alike
have become more receptive to the idea of comprehensive planning. This
attitude has been particularly evident in the relatively new suburban
cities and villages experiencing the swelling tide of population growth.
Officials and residents in these units have become concerned not only with
community amenities but also with the attainment and preservation of a
tax base that will permit adequate public services at reasonable rates.
Community planners and policy makers are well aware that commercial
and industrial properties contribute two to three times as much in local
taxes as they receive in services, while among residential uses only the
highest cost property pays its own way. As the demand for and cost of
municipal services have increased, the need for communities to maintain
a balanced economic base has become more acute. It is largely for this
reason that suburban cities and villages long hostile to it now vie with
each other to attract industry within their boundaries. Only the wealthy
residential enclaves have been able to withstand this trend.
Plagued with present and potential fiscal woes, many suburban com-
munities are attempting to exercise some control over the increasing de-
mand for public services and the resulting burden on the municipal tax
base by regulating the rate and character of their development. Instead
of usual methods of slowing and upgrading the quality of growth through
zoning and subdivision regulations, some municipalities are now approach-
ing the problem of timing urban growth and shaping a balanced com-
munity by more systematic means. The controls employed are closely re-
lated to carefully drawn plans for integrating all aspects of community
development. These efforts, while differing from community to com-
munity, seek essentially to accomplish two objectives in addition to the
over-all goal of providing a pleasant and livable environment: the pre-
vention of excessive sprawl and premature land subdivision, and the assur-
ance of a balanced economic base that will permit the effective operation
of local government at a reasonable tax rate.5-
52. These objectives are well stated in the following planning goals of Mcnomonce Fa l,
Wisconsin, a rapidly growing community on the periphery of the Bilwauhce metropolitan
area: (1) The creation of a pleasant, satisfying, and attractive living and worhing cnviron-
ment, with convenient shopping and service areas, ample open Epace and rccrcation areas,
provision of an adequate level of public services, protection, and schools, availability of
cultural and entertainment facilities, and a safe and efficient circulation sytcm. (2) The
attainment of a balanced and stable municipal economy v.ith the resources and capacity to
achieve the first goal and still maintain a predictable and moderate tax rate, and vith sufil-
dent broadness of base to survive possible changes in patterns of tax distribution, economic
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The first objective has been sought in various ways, most of them de-
signed to encourage growth around existing settlements before opening
additional land to intensive use. These methods include: (1) public pur-
chase of outlying land (or development rights thereto) to be placed on
the market as needs dictate; (2) limiting the number of building permits
that are issued each year; (3) demarcation of an urban service district
and zoning of all land outside this area for agricultural uses exclusively
until such time as the city is prepared to extend its service zone; (4) high
zoning in the outlying sections of the municipality with the understanding
that the requirements will be lowered when a certain percentage of de-
velopment has been attained in the intervening area; (5) high zoning
restrictions in the outlying sectors of the community with the intention
of reducing these when the city is ready to extend sewer and water
utilities.
Municipal purchase of land or development rights in order to control
sprawl and preserve open spaces rests on sound legal footing. Such an ap-
proach would, of course, require new enabling legislation in most states."
The principle here is similar to that involved in cases where municipali-
ties have been permitted to purchase and assemble land for industrial
parks and then lease or sell it to private operators. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that this device will be widely pursued in view of the inadequate
fiscal resources at the local government level, the high cost of land, and
potential public opposition to the city entering the real estate business.
Unlike the purchasing method, use of building permits to control the
rate of municipal growth is a dubious legal device. In the one case where
this question arose, the opinion was adverse to such practice. 4 The Town
of New Castle, New York, had enacted an ordinance specifying that no
more than 112 building permits could be issued annually for any land
within a special residential district. (Practically all undeveloped resi-
dential land in the town had been placed in such districts.) The court
held that nothing in the state statutes authorized the town to regulate its
rate of growth, and that even if such power had been conferred, the ordi-
conditions, or population and service demand. Village of Menomonee Falls, Wis., General
Plan for Community Development (1960).
53. California has enacted statutes designed to preserve open spaces by permitting ex-
penditure of public funds by cities and counties to annex uninhabited territory. It would
also permit the local units to lease back such land to its original owner or others under
covenants that will keep the property as open space. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 6950-54. New
York has enacted similar legislation, except that the municipality must retain the land. The
former owner may, by agreement, continue to occupy and use it for a period not exceeding
five years, during which period it remains on the tax rolls. N.Y. Conserv. Law §§ 875-85.
54. Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
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nance would be unconstitutional as an unreasonable deprivation of the
owners' beneficial use of their land.
The last three devices are similar in character. Each relies on high
zoning restrictions to accomplish its objective: one by exclusive agricultural
zoning, the others by minimum lot and house size requirements. Zoning
exclusively for agricultural purposes has been used, particularly in Cali-
fornia,55 to protect farm land. Whether it could be used to control the
timing of urban expansion is another question." The other two methods
utilize upgraded zoning to discourage development in the outlying dis-
tricts while permitting more intensive use of land closer to the urban
center. At the same time, the peripheral districts are designated for
change to lower minimums once the initial lands near full utilization. The
use of sewer and water extension as a means of control is probably the
most practical of these devices. A municipality can budget funds for the
extension of these utilities to coincide with the development of the inter-
vening area. The rationale here is that the higher requirements will dis-
courage premature subdivision of outlying areas and yet meet the judicial
test of reasonableness since larger lot areas are normally needed for
individual septic tanks and wellsY
All of these devices, by establishing a pattern of orderly progression
outward from the service area of the city, represent efforts to prevent
scattered leapfrog subdividing. Such a pattern minimizes sprawl, places
less strain upon community facilities and services, and permits a more
economical and efficient extension of streets and utilities, thereby reducing
long-term municipal expenses.
The second and closely related objective-a balanced economic base-
also contemplates use of several of the above controls. Communities seek-
ing this objective usually rest their general plan of development on three
major premises: (1) necessity of maintaining a practical balance between
the residential and nonresidential elements of the community composition;
(2) responsibility to provide for various densities in residential districts
so that no economic class will be excluded because of uniformly high
zoning restrictions; and (3) importance of preventing disproportionate
low-cost residential expansion beyond the reasonable capacity of the sup-
porting tax base.
55. See Cal. Gov't Code § 35009.
56. One of the few cases dealing with the encroachment of other ure3 in a d-trict zoned
for agriculture is County of Cook v. Glasstex Co., 16 III. 2d 72, 156 N.E-2d 519 (19s9).
The court in this instance upheld an ordinance which barred a lhht industrial use from an
area zoned for farming.
57. In Bogert v. Township of Washington, 25 NJ. 57, 133 A.2d 1 (1957), a one-acre
minimum requirement in a block adjacent to lower zoned areas was sustained due to lac:
of sewer facilities. The court held it reasonable to put the block in a more rc tricted
category since septic tanks had to be used.
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These premises are given expression in multifaceted but closely inte-
grated plans that emphasize the following features: (1) careful assess-
ment of the community's role and position in the metropolitan complex
of which it is a part; (2) zoning which establishes residential districts of
varying densities geared to the community's existing and potential eco-
nomic base; (3) zoning which protects prime industrial and commercial
land from encroachment by other uses; and (4) systematic conversion of
selected undeveloped areas through rezoning to smaller lots at a rate and
quantity carefully keyed to increases in the community's commercial,
industrial, and high quality residential base.
If communities are to fulfill their social responsibility, they must pro-
vide home sites for the lower as well as higher income groups. Many
suburban cities and villages have ignored this responsibility by establish-
ing high zoning restrictions-some because of fiscal necessity, others
through a sense of social exclusiveness. As long as land is available for
lower cost residential construction in other parts of an urban area, high
restrictive zoning will probably continue to meet judicial approbation.
This issue was touched upon in Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v.
Borough of Cresskill," in which exclusive residential zoning for an entire
community was sustained. After noting that substantial amounts of land
peculiarly adapted to industrial use remained undeveloped in other sec-
tions of the same geographic region, the court concluded:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends not only
on all the conditions, physical, economic and social, prevailing within the municipality
and its needs, present and reasonably prospective, but also on the nature of the entire
region in which the municipality is located and the use to which the land in that region
has been or may be put most advantageously. 9
The same point was made in Valley View Village v. Proffett,00 in which
zoning of a municipality solely for residential purposes was held to be not
per se unreasonable as an exercise of the police power. The court stated in
effect that the legislative body of a city should not be required to shut
its eyes to conditions beyond its own boundaries in determining the
purposes for which land shall be used but may consider facilities offered
by nearby areas.
This condition of abundancy cannot be expected to continue in view of
the rapid consumption of land in urban areas. What is reasonable zoning
today may well become unreasonable with tomorrow's land scarcity. The
time is not far off in many metropolitan communities when the residential
housing demands of lower income groups will exceed the land zoned to
meet their needs and resources. When that day comes, the pressure for
58. 1 N.J. 509, 64 A.2d 347 (1949).
59. Id. at 513, 64 A.2d at 349-50.
60. 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955).
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smaller lot zoning and higher densities in the undeveloped suburban
sectors will intensify. It seems inevitable that sooner or later the courts
will take this fact into consideration in determining the reasonableness
of zoning restrictions. The issue thus far has not been joined specifically
in these terms nor has a "Brandeis brief" been presented on this point in
any of the suburban zoning cases. Yet language used by the courts in
several instances underscores the possibility that the test of reasonable-
ness may soon be enlarged to include the relationship of questioned
zoning to the needs of the larger urban area as well as the local munici-
pality. As early as the historic decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Village of Eclid v. Am ler Realty Co.,"' courts have implied
that metropolitan or regional needs may so far outweigh the interest of a
local municipality that the latter may not be allowed to stand in the way
of the larger public interest!"
Recognizing the implications inherent in the present and emerging
situation, a number of suburban communities have sought rational and
equitable solutions to their growth problems through plans embodying
several or all of the objectives and premises listed above. Their compre-
hensive plans call for a gradation of zoning restrictions in the various
districts of the city or town in order to accommodate income groups of
different levels.03 Assuming a given economic base, they determine that
the community can afford a residential mLx consisting of a certain per-
centage of small, medium, and large size lots. To prevent low cost
residential development from shooting too far ahead of its supporting
industrial, commercial, and high quality residential tax base, they em-
ploy one of the systematic conversion devices previously described. In
this way, they seek to base the development of the community on a
realistic evaluation of its resources and potential and to direct its growth
within economically tolerable limits.
How well will these new plans and their accompanying devices stand
up under legal attack? First of all, it is evident that many of the methods
which they rely on-minimum lot requirements, bulk controls, and sub-
division regulations-are judicially acceptable. Second, the fact that they
are used for purposes other than those originally intended should not
affect their validity. As long as zoning requirements meet the test of
reasonableness, courts have been reluctant to inquire into the motives
prompting their enactment. Thus in Ward v. Township of Montgomery ,
where a district was zoned for industrial use with the manifest intention
61. 272 US. 365 (1926).
62. See Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 16S, 173, S9 A,2d 693, 697
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953).
63. See, e.g., City of Mequon, ,is., Zoning Ordinance, April 9, 1960.
64. 2S NJ. 529, 147 A.2d 24S (1959).
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of strengthening the town's tax base, the court held that the pursuit of
such an objective through land use regulation "will not warrant judicial
condemnation as long as it represents an otherwise valid exercise of the
statutory zoning authority."' 5 Similarly, in Rockaway Estates, Inc. v.
Rockaway Township,0 the New Jersey Superior Court stated that "so
long as such grounds exist for zoning as are demanded by the statute,
there is no sound objection to the consideration of cost of municipal
services in the establishment of the zones." 7
The mere fact that growth leads to an increased tax rate does not of
itself justify restrictions on the use of property. Yet a persuasive con-
sideration for land use regulation is the fact that uncontrolled growth
adversely affects the community and the area since it precipitates the
construction of schools, roads, and other public facilities in a haphazard,
poor and inadequate fashion. The major issue in each instance should be
whether the zoning ordinance has been enacted mainly to exclude rather
than insure orderly and planned growth. If it can be shown that the
planning program and the instruments used to carry it out are based on
careful studies of the community's economic potential and its relation
to the housing needs of the urban area of which it is a part, the restric-
tions (even though novel) will likely be viewed with favor by the courts.
It is worthy of note that during the past decade, courts have mani-
fested a noticeably more sympathetic and tolerant attitude toward com-
munity planning. A broad reading of Berman v. Parker,8 for example,
indicates that the Constitution will accommodate a wide range of com-
munity planning devices as local governments seek new ways to meet the
pressing problems of growth. 9 Carefully drawn plans, well conceived
from the standpoint of land use and community needs, are the surest
safeguard against legal invalidity. The integrated approach which is
being tried or considered by some communities admittedly has a utopian
flavor. Whether it can be carried out under the pressure of growth or
under present local governmental arrangements is a matter of sheer specu-
lation. Yet what is important is the indication it gives that many local
officials and planning boards are beginning to think in broader and more
enlightened terms.
65. Id. at 535, 147 A.2d at 251.
66. 38 N.J. Super. 468, 119 A.2d 461 (Super. Ct. 1955).
67. Id. at 477, 119 A.2d at 466.
68. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
69. See generally Johnson, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 199 (1955).
